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ABSTRACT 
Voluntary corporate governance disclosures are the additional information regarding 
corporate governance mechanism which increases investor’s confidence while making 
sound investment decisions. On the other hand, corporate governance is considered as 
a significant mechanism for controlling and monitoring of management decisions on 
behalf of shareholders, which ultimately leads towards higher disclosure level. This 
study, therefore, examines the voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
corporate governance mechanism in Malaysia for the period of 2012 to 2015, to 
analyze the effects of new corporate governance reforms: Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance 2012. This study aimed to achieve three objectives: Firstly, to 
examine the voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices among Malaysian 
listed property companies; Secondly, to assess the corporate governance mechanism 
among Malaysian listed property companies; and lastly to evaluate the influence of 
corporate governance mechanism on the level of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure of Malaysian listed property companies for the period of 2012 to 2015. By 
using quantitative methods, this study investigated balanced panel data of 85 
Malaysian listed property companies for the period of 2012 to 2015. By employing 
bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis on panel data, the study found 
that board size, board independents, female board of directors, audit committee size, 
audit committee meetings, audit committee independence and company size positively 
and significantly influence the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosures. 
However, no influence was found among block holder ownership, second block-holder 
ownership and management ownership on the level of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures. This study concluded based on the results that, companies can improve 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure by improving the corporate 
governance information. This study assessed the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure practices of listed property companies, the sector of Bursa Malaysia, rarely 
focused by the related research community.
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ABSTRAK 
Pendedahan tadbir urus korporat sukarela adalah maklumat tambahan mengenai 
mekanisme tadbir urus korporat yang meningkatkan keyakinan pelabur ketika 
membuat keputusan pelaburan yang baik. Di samping itu, tadbir urus korporat juga 
dianggap sebagai mekanisme terpenting dalam mengawalselia keputusan yang dibuat 
oleh pihak pengurusan bagi pihak pemegang saham, yang akhirnya membawa kepada 
tahap pendedahan yang lebih tinggi. Oleh itu, kajian ini meneliti pendedahan tadbir 
urus korporat secara sukarela dan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia bagi 
tempoh 2012 hingga 2015, bagi menganalisa kesan pembaharuan tadbir urus korporat 
baru: Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia 2012. Kajian ini mempunyai tiga objektif: 
Pertama, untuk mengkaji amalan penzahiran tadbir urus korporat sukarela di kalangan 
syarikat harta tanah tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia; Kedua, untuk menilai mekanisme 
tadbir urus korporat di kalangan syarikat harta tanah tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia  dan   
menilai pengaruh mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dalam mempengaruhi tahap 
pendedahan sukarela syarikat-syarikat harta tanah tersenarai bagi tempoh 2012 hingga 
2015. Kajian menggunakan kaedah kuantitatif, data dari 85 buah syarikat hartanah 
tersenarai di Malaysia untuk tempoh 2012 hingga 2015 telah diperolehi. Dengan 
menggunakan kaedah korelasi bivariate dan analisis regresi berganda, kajian 
mendapati saiz lembaga, lembaga tidak bersandar , lembaga pengarah wanita, dewan 
pengarah wanita, saiz jawatankuasa audit, mesyuarat jawatankuasa audit, kebebasan 
jawatankuasa audit dan saiz syarikat secara positif dan signifikan berkaitan dengan 
tahap pendedahan urus tadbir korporat sukarela. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada hubungan 
yang terdapat di kalangan pemilikan pemegang blok, pemilikan pemegang blok kedua 
dan pemilikan pengurusan. Secara keseluruhannya, didapati amalan tadbir urus 
korporat sukarela dan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat telah bertambah baik semasa 
tempoh persampelan. Kajian ini menilai amalan penzahiran tadbir urus korporat 
sukarela syarikat-syarikat hartanah tersenarai, sektor Bursa Malaysia, jarang 
ditumpukan oleh komuniti penyelidikan berkaitan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This study analyzes the behavior of Malaysian listed property companies towards 
adopting the level of voluntary disclosure regarding corporate governance as listed in 
criteria provided by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) for achieving 
investors’ confidence. Since Malaysia has growing property industry, therefore this 
research is focusing on property sector only. The outcomes of the study are the analysis 
of the level of Malaysian listed property companies with respect to corporate 
governance reporting. This research also analyzes the influence of corporate 
governance factors (board structure, ownership structure, audit committee) on 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures of the company.  
This chapter presents the background, problem and objectives on which this 
study is based on. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents 
research background while Section 1.3 enlightens the problem statement. The research 
questions were developed in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 presents research objectives. 
In Section 1.6 the scope of the study is defined. Section 1.7 describes the significance 
of the research. Terms and definitions used in this research are explained in Section 
1.8. The outline of the thesis is presented in Section 1.9. Lastly, Section 1.10 duly 
summaries this chapter. 
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1.2 Research background 
Corporate governance framework of a company deemed to be a key factor which 
attracts local and foreign investment as it ensures the return on investment. This is due 
to the fact that, strong governance mechanism enforced by country’s stock markets, 
require companies to disclose corporate governance information, which help investors 
to make sound decision making (Saxena, 2016). Global business world have seen 
number of corporate financial scandals, for example, Enron and Worldcom (US), 
Pacific Electric Wire & Cable, Infodisc Technology, Procomp, Simmit Technology 
(Taiwan) and Renong Berhad, UEM and KFC (Malaysia) arose in the early 2000s, 
which exposed the lack of good governance practices and their importance among 
investor’s decisions (Chen, 2016). Therefore the effective and efficient stock market, 
with high level of transparency about corporate governance, boosts investors’ 
confidence in making financial decisions (Jaffar et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
disclosures made in annual report is also a basic source of information for all 
stakeholder and therefore they are required to be highly standard, professional, 
transparent and creative (Trang & Phuong, 2015). 
 The information regarding corporate governance, communicated through 
annual reports, can be divided into two major categories named mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures. Mandatory disclosures are amount of information in company’s 
annual report required by the regulatory bodies of a country to disclose up to a standard 
(Saxena, 2016). Although there are statuary requirement to disclose certain amount of 
information (mandatory disclosures) in annual reports, there are cases where 
companies disclose information in excess of required standards (Madhani, 2016). This 
additional information is called voluntary disclosures which are made for assisting 
investors’ decision and assessing risk factors of company’s securities. On the other 
hand, despite of agreed importance of disclosures, many gaps are found in previous 
studies regarding information disclosures by listed companies. While analyzing the 
voluntary disclosure by listed firms in Malaysia, Lokman, Mula, and Cotter (2011) 
examined their compliance with mandatory and voluntary disclosure developed by 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), on the basis of principles in 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance standards. Doing so, they found major gap 
of compliance with these standards, ending in low level disclosures and 
misconceptions among stakeholders. The results show that voluntary disclosure 
PTTA
PER
PUS
TAK
AAN
 TU
NKU
 TU
N A
MIN
AH
3 
 
practices are weak in companies with concentrated family control. In this context, 
regulatory bodies such as Malaysian Institute of Management (MIM), Bursa Securities 
Malaysia Berhad (BSMB), and Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
are in continuous process of enhancing the regulatory framework to improve the 
adoptions and implementation of corporate governance standards. Therefore, they 
have also incorporated the corporate governance standards in listing requirements of 
BSMB, which requires all listed companies to disclosure corporate governance 
information in annual report under the domain of corporate governance statement 
(Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2016). By following these qualities enhancing principles, the 
company can display their transparency at all levels of reporting, which further leads 
towards organization’s growth and prospects along with increases confidence and trust 
among all stakeholders of the company. 
Additional information and specifically voluntary disclosures provided in 
annual reports influence shareholder’s decision-making process related to investment. 
Therefore, the transparency and completeness in information, at all levels, will boost 
investors’ confidence positively (Jallow et al., 2012; Lan, Wang, & Zhang, 2013). At 
the same time, relevant and faithful representation of annual reports not only is useful 
for the readers but also allows them to make correct decisions and make efficient use 
of scarce resources (Akhtaruddin, 2005). This enables corporations to become credibly 
reputable and enjoy higher share prices through trust among investors (Palea, 2013). 
However, it requires company’s management to provide adequate and relevant 
information, and on the other side, regulatory agencies to develop and establish 
standards to enforce transparency (Abdullah, Minhat, & Campus, 2013). 
Despite the fact that regulatory agencies have emphasized on the importance 
of information, Abdullah et al. (2013) witnessed common trend of non-compliance 
with accounting standards taking six years’ annual reports of Malaysian public listed 
companies. It was claimed here that ineffective enforcement mechanism in Malaysia 
reasoned the weak compliance of mandated laws (Abdullah et al., 2013). Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) is majorly aimed at promoting greater and 
effective communication of corporate governance information by timely, informative, 
factual, and readers-friendly annual report. Their report recognizes excellence in 
presentation of mandatory as well as voluntary information regarding corporate 
governance (Lan et al., 2013). 
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On the contrary, the transparency and disclosure of information become doubted in the 
presence of separation of ownership and control, which creates agency conflicts in the 
corporation. Furthermore, board of directors, if act according to the guideline provided 
by the code of corporate governance, can play a key role to act in the best interest of 
shareholders which will lead towards higher transparency in corporation (Alfraih & 
Ashton, 2016). Therefore, corporate governance is one of the important factors 
influencing the level of voluntary disclosures. For this purpose, proper governance 
structure to monitor disclosure activities is imperative. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) 
claimed that the number of independent board of directors is associated with more 
voluntary disclosures. Contrary to this, Jaffar et al. (2007) found that quality of audit 
committee is generally effective in ensuring more corporate transparency. 
Since Malaysia is an emerging economy, the property industry plays important 
role in determining the performance of the country’s economy. It provides social and 
economic infrastructure for industrial production (Eng et al., 2015; Ibrahim et al., 
2010). Malaysia has seen incredible and significant growth in property and real estate 
sector since 2000. The property and real estate investment is considered more secure 
in investment portfolio. However, in the changing trend investor has started showing 
interest in the more liquid form of investment in property and real estate by stock 
market investment in property and real estate shares (Razali & Adnan, 2012). On the 
other hand, as the emergence of globalization brings new challenges, the property and 
real estate companies can attract more investment through transparency and 
effectiveness in internal environment. Although many studies have studies 
transparency in properties companies, but less focus has been given to transparency 
and governance mechanism of listed property companies of Malaysia. The 
transparency and the level of disclosure can be enhanced by good corporate 
governance. With this objective, this study focuses on the assessment of level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and corporate governance mechanism 
among Malaysian listed property companies. 
1.3 Problem statement 
Being the 3rd largest sector of Bursa Malaysia based on market capitalization, property 
sectors is under the limelight of foreign investor as it provides more liquid alternatives 
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for their direct real estate holdings (Razali & Adnan, 2012). However, emerging 
economies like Malaysia, face many challenges to adopt high quality measures 
towards the financial reporting in order to attract foreign investment in Bursa Malaysia 
(Samaha et al., 2012). One of the main constrain in Malaysian corporate environment 
is highly concentrated family owned companies, which effect corporate governance 
efficiency, company’s performance and level of disclosure by company (Amran & 
Ahmad, 2013; Razali & Adnan, 2012). After 1997/1998 financial crisis, corporate 
governance gained more attention because it was considered as one of the reason 
behind the crises (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). From the introduction of Malaysian code 
of corporate governance in 2000, to the upgrading of code in 2007 and 2012, many 
measures have been taken to improve corporate governance in Malaysia. These 
measures overcome highly concentrated ownership effect and increases financial 
transparency through high level disclosures in annual reports. This study is aimed to 
identify the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosures practices and 
corporate governance mechanism among Malaysian listed property companies from 
2012, when the code of corporate governance was upgraded.  
Countries with high legal standards have high chances of more influx of foreign 
investment (Torchia et al., 2016). Siekkinen (2015) also claimed that foreign investor’s 
protection by the country’s strong legal system limits the chances of insider’s 
expropriation, because it also leads towards a positive impact on currency exchange 
rate and asset price of companies too. Therefore, foreign investor always considers 
investing in countries and companies which take quality measures to protect small 
investors’ rights. Strong corporate governance mechanism monitors and control 
business activities and secure minority shareholders interest. However, in the presence 
of highly concentrated ownership in a company doubted the role played by corporate 
governance mechanism. The major shareholders with higher percentage of ownership 
can misappropriate minority shareholders interest (Aishah Hashim & Devi, 2008; 
Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Bokpin & Arko, 2009; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Lemmon 
& Lins, 2003; Li et al., 2015). 
Property investment can be made in either buying physical property in-form-
of residential and commercial property or investing in shares of property sector in 
stock market. Buying physical property provides more secure and risk-free investment 
option, however it comprises some drawbacks for example: the income generated from 
buying physical property is realized after long time. Along with that, the capital 
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invested had to withheld with same property for long period. Therefore, shareholding 
in property sectors have become more popular nowadays, because it provides more 
liquid investment option in property sectors. Malaysian property sector offer 
abundance opportunities, with advance free market (Thim et al., 2012). Kuala Lumpur; 
the capital city of Malaysia was rated as above average performing market, which was 
still positive at the time of financial crisis. However, the main issue in which doubted 
in Malaysian capital market is highly concentrated ownership companies. 
Concentrated ownership is considered as an important factor in disclosure and 
governance studies (Lokman et al., 2011). Agency theory also highlighted that in the 
presence of highly concentrated ownership, the dominant owner can avoid the interest 
of minority shareholder. Board of directors are the key authorities to implement good 
governance mechanism, however majority shareholder influences the decision-making 
process of the company which effects the quality of decision made by board of 
directors. Therefore, this study considered property sector of Bursa Malaysia as a best 
case for analyzing voluntary corporate governance disclosures practices and corporate 
governance disclosures in Malaysia. 
The main source of information about the company’s policy structure and 
investors’ relations strategies are corporate disclosures in the annual report of a 
corporate firm. Corporate disclosures are divided into mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Mandatory disclosures are the minimum amount of information required 
by the statutory and legal bodies of the country for listed companies. It can be assumed 
that listed companies are following all legal requirement for successfully continue their 
listing requirements. On the other hand, for the comparison among informative and 
non-informative annual report can be judged by the amount of additional information 
provided by the company in-form-of annual reports. Foreign investors are also concern 
about the additional amount of information in form of voluntary disclosed in the annual 
report, prior to taking investment decision about the company. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosures play pivotal role in the influencing investment decision making process of 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the main objective of these disclosures is to inform 
investors and analysts about the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future earnings of 
a company (Van Beest, Braam, & Boelens, 2009). However, there were very few 
studies on voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices in Malaysia. This study 
will fill the gap and provide an empirical evidence for voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures practices among listed property companies on Bursa Malaysia. 
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Nevertheless, many measures have regarding quality enhancing been taken by 
regulatory bodies in Malaysia to enhance the level and quality of voluntary disclosures 
for the improvement of financial statements by corporate firms. Agencies such as 
Malaysian Institute of Management (MIM), Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad 
(BSMB), and Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) have introduced 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) which is a recognition process for 
those companies who fully comply with the standard of disclosing corporate 
governance information. The main objective of MSWG is for promoting standards for 
adoption and transparent corporate governance reporting in Malaysia by giving a 
framework of voluntary corporate governance disclosures (Lokman et al., 2011). This 
study examines the voluntary corporate governance practices among listed property 
companies in Malaysia under Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
criteria. 
Adoption of high level of standards does not necessarily guarantee results in 
high quality information disclosure by firm. Better investor relationships will be 
achieved if the governance mechanism and monitoring system is maintained and 
implemented according to the Code of Corporate Governance of Malaysia. In recent 
years, many regulators and governance bodies have ensured the adoption and 
implementation of corporate governance; locally and internationally which can also 
help to enhance the disclosure practices among listed companies. The New York stock 
exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) have proposed a new list of standard regarding corporate 
governance which was approved by Securities and Exchange Commission SEC on 
November 4, 2003 (Alhaji & Yusoff, 2012). In Malaysia corporate governance gained 
more attention after the 1997/1998 financial crisis because it was considered as one of 
the reason behind the crises (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). As the firms governance 
mechanism have major influence over decision making of companies, these crisis 
cause many corporate collapses, and expose the weak corporate governance practices 
among these companies (Manzaneque, Merino, & Priego, 2016). The weak corporate 
governance practices include lack of transparency, financial disclosure and 
accountability, and poor legal protection of small investors against expropriation by 
corporate insiders. Nevertheless, Malaysian listed companies are now putting effort to 
improve the quality of disclosures for attracting the foreign investors, as they are 
continuously improving their corporate governance (Akmalia, Ibrahim, & Othman, 
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2007), and it is expected to see more improvements in future. Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance has been consciously improved to cope up with the global 
corporate governance standard. The last code was upgraded in 2012 which focus more 
on highly independent board of directors and audit committee. This research is 
therefore aimed to identify current position of corporate governance practices after 
introduction of amended Code of Corporate Governance among Malaysian listed 
property companies by examining annual report. 
A good corporate governance results in good disclosure behavior by corporate 
firms. Many studies have been conducted to find the relationship between corporate 
governance and disclosures. Jiambalvo (1996) founded a negative relationship 
between governance mechanisms and financial reporting. On the other hand, recently 
Alhaji and Yusoff (2012) evidenced that poor disclosure quality results due to poor 
corporate governance mechanism. Despite the recent research on corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure, the relationship is ambiguous because previous 
researches proposed/presents unclear and inconsistence results. Alfraih and Ashton 
(2016) also argued that more research is required to identify the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and disclosures. Therefore, this study will also 
assess the influence of corporate governance attributes on level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure among Malaysian listed property companies. 
1.4 Research questions 
Based on problem statement, this research covers three research questions: 
(i) What is the current level of voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
practices among Malaysian listed property companies in the period of 2012 
to 2015?  
(ii) What is the level of practices of corporate governance mechanism among 
Malaysian listed property companies for the period of 2012 to 2015? 
(iii) Does corporate governance mechanism influence the level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure among Malaysian listed property companies 
for the period of 2012 to 2015? 
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1.5 Objectives of study 
This study embarks on the following objectives: 
(i) To examine the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices 
among Malaysian listed property companies in Bursa Malaysia for a period 
of 2012 to 2015: 
(ii) To assess the level of practices of corporate governance mechanism among 
Malaysian listed property companies for a period of 2012 to 2015; 
(iii) To evaluate the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices among Malaysian listed 
property companies for a period of 2012 to 2015. 
1.6 Scope of study 
This study is scoped at: 
 This study is limited to an investigation of annual reports of public listed 
companies only in property Sector in Bursa Malaysia. This study has 
systematically compare the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure in 
annual reports only among the selected properties companies; 
 Only voluntary corporate governance disclosures are examined in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed property companies; 
 This study has collected and assessed the annual reports for a period of 2012 to 
2015. 
1.7 Significance of study 
This research was contributed to several groups of financial participants involved in 
property sector of Bursa Malaysia. The targeted audience of this research includes 
investors, regulators and policy makers, properties listed companies, researchers, and 
academics. First of all, investor are expected to gain confidence when they have 
sufficient corporate information available in form of corporate disclosure by the 
properties listed companies of Bursa Malaysia, as they will fill the gap identified in 
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